NOTE
Mains Farm v. Worthington: Fair Housing Laws and
Fear of Adult Family Homes
Todd H. Carlisle*
At first glance, the Washington State Supreme Court's decision in
Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington' might appear to be
merely an extension of a long line of Washington cases in which courts
have exercised their inherent equitable powers and properly enjoined
the breach of a private, legally enforceable restrictive covenant.'
However, as one looks more closely at the implications of Mains Farm
in the context of the societal trend towards full integration of individuals with disabilities into the American mainstream, 3 the supreme
court's decision in Mains Farm becomes somewhat more problematic.
As a result of Mains Farm,judicial precedent in Washington State
is firmly set: For-profit owner operated group homes for the disabled4
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helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Note.
1. 121 Wash. 2d 810, 854 P.2d 1072 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mt. Baker Park Presbyterian Church, 113 Wash 458, 466, 194 P.
536, 539 (1920); Krein v. Smith, 60 Wash. App. 809, 812-13, 807 P.2d 906, 907-8, reviet denied,
117 Wash. 2d 1002 (1991).
3. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 171, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 18 (1988) ("The federal Fair
Housing Act is a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the exclusion of persons
with handicaps from the American mainstream .... "); H.R. REP. No. 485 (III), 101st Cong.,
2nd Sess. 23 (1990) ("The purpose of the ADA is to provide a dear and comprehensive national
mandate to. .. bring [individuals with disabilities] into the economic and social mainstream of
American life.").
4. The term "group home for the disabled" is a broad generic term potentially applicable
in many contexts. In this Note it will be used synonymously with the narrower, specifically
defined statutory term "adult family home." Although there is no universally accepted definition
of a group home, an "adult family home" is described by the Washington State Legislature as "a
regular family abode of a person or persons who are providing personal care, room, and board to
more than one but not more than four adults ... not related ... to the person.
providing the
services . . . " WASH. REV. CODE § 70.128.010(1) (1994).
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have been designated by the Washington State Supreme Court as
"commercial" and "institutional" however hard they may try to
emulate family life, and however minimally they may impact the
surrounding community.'
In the aftermath of the Mains Farm
decision, group homes are vulnerable to judicial attack if they are
situated or proposed in subdivisions and other residential communities
in this state which are subject to "single-family dwelling/residential
use" restrictive covenants. Mains Farm thus empowers group home
neighbors who may harbor "Not-In-My-Back-Yard" ("NIMBY") 6
sentiments with the legal means to attack and expel group homes for
the disabled from their communities. In response to this threat, group
home defenders and advocates for the disabled in Washington State
must closely analyze the majority Mains Farm opinion and develop an
effective strategy by which to defeat future similar law suits.
Although the Mains Farm majority's conclusion that a group
home for the disabled is neither a single-family dwelling nor a
residential use is certainly questionable,7 this Note is neither intended
as an addition to the "what is a family?" definitional debate, nor as a
proposal that the issues decided in Mains Farm be re-litigated.
Instead, this Note will: (1) analyze the Mains Farm controversy from
the often ignored perspective of disabled individuals who benefit from
community based group homes, and (2) present applicable state and

The legislature further defines adult family homes as providing a "humane, safe, and
homelike environment for persons with functional limitations who need personal and special care
... .
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.128.007(1) (1994). Anyone in Washington State eighteen years
of age or older who, has a "developmental disability or physical or mental disability, [that]
requires supervision and assistance in personal care services" is eligible for placement in an adult
family home. SEE WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-76-030(5) (1992).
Please note that the term "disabled" used throughout this Note may refer to individuals who
are either developmentally disabled, physically disabled, and/or mentally ill.
5. See Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d at 818-19, 854 P.2d at 1076.
6. The term "NIMBY" used throughout this Note generally refers to the protectionist
attitude of individuals and neighborhood groups intent on preserving the current character of their
residential communities by actively resisting what they perceive as unwanted local developments.
In a publication proposing "low key" siting strategies for group homes and other community
based social service providers, Michael Dear argues that the NIMBY syndrome "represents the
pre-eminent threat to community-based human services."
MICHAEL DEAR, GAINING
COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE 6 (1991). Dear also quotes from a speech given by Edward I. Koch,
the former mayor of New York, in which Koch criticizes the fear and suspicion inherent in the
NIMBY syndrome and warns of regression into a "new feudalism" in which neighborhoods and
communities "march backwards towards the imaginary safety of feudal fiefdoms defended by
NIMBY walls." Id. at 2.
7. In a strong dissent in Mains Farm, Justice Durham, joined by Justice Johnson, criticized
the majority's conclusion that a small group home is neither a residential use nor a family. Justice
Durham ultimately concluded that the majority's reasoning in Mains Farm lacked "any principled
boundaries." Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d at 829, 854 P.2d at 1081.
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federal law by which group homes threatened with judicial attack in
the wake of the Mains Farm ruling can defend themselves.
Specifically, Section I of this Note will present an overview of
both the benefits of group homes for the disabled and the various ways
in which resistant NIMBY neighbors and municipalities have
attempted to banish them. Section II will analyze the Mains Farm
decision. Section III will explore evidence of an overriding public
policy favoring the establishment of group homes for the disabled in
Washington State. Section IV will analyze the neighbors' conduct in
Mains Farm under both the federal Fair Housing Act and Washington's Law Against Discrimination.
Ultimately, this Note will conclude that future group home
defenders should not concentrate on re-litigating the issues decided in
Mains Farm. Instead, their focus should be on seeking an authoritative
judicial determination that neighbors who attempt to use a "singlefamily dwelling/residential use" restrictive covenant to banish group
homes for the disabled from their communities are violating both state
and federal fair housing laws.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

The last thirty years have seen the advent of small-scale,
community-based group homes in the United States as the preferred
model for residential treatment of individuals who are either mentally
ill or physically and/or developmentally disabled.' The growth in the
number of group homes for the disabled in Washington State, and the
corresponding decrease in hospitalized and otherwise institutionallyconfined individuals, 9 has been attributed both to a growing concern

8. A huge body of research literature was produced in the 1970s and 80s in support of
theories that deinstitutionalization, community integration, and "normalization" in the least
restrictive environment possible positively affect the quality of life of individuals who are disabled.
See, e.g., R.L. Schlock & R.S. Harper, Independent Living and the Disabled: A Systematic
Approach to Ind6pendent Living Training, in 1 FRONTIERS OF KNOWLEDGE IN MENTAL
THE
RETARDATION 23 (Peter Mittler ed., 1981); ELINOR GOLLAY, COMING BACK:
COMMUNITY EXPERIENCES OF DEINSTITUTIONALIZED MENTALLY ILL PEOPLE (1978);

Richard Eyman, Relationship Between Community Environments and Resident Changes In Adaptive
Behavior: A Path Model, 4 AM. J. OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY 83 (1979).
9. Both the devastating effects of institutional life and the shift away from institutionalization
to community-based placement in Washington State is documented in BARBARA BREECHEN,
FROM SEGREGATION TO COMMUNITY INTEGRATION, WASHINGTON STATE DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES SERVICES, 1861-1990 (1988).
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for and appreciation of the civil rights of the disabled ° and to
bottom-line budgetary considerations.1 1
Unfortunately, the national trend towards deinstitutionalization
and community-based living for individuals with disabilities has, at
times, met resistance at the local level. In numerous instances, the
NIMBY syndrome has manifested itself in the form of opposition to
the establishment of group homes for the disabled in particular
neighborhoods and municipalities.12 A legacy of centuries of bias
against and fear of the disabled,1 3 combined with a related and more
readily articulated fear that group homes negatively affect both
men
meen
rso
led to
have
"asav
community,
property values and the "character of 1the coad
16
5
legal challenges, public protests, and even arson" as a means of
keeping group homes out of particularly resistant neighborhoods.
Although there are few reported instances of violent resistance to
the establishment of group homes, case law expansively documents

10. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Disabled, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54 (1982); Symposium, The Administration
of PsychiatricJustice: Theory and PracticeIn Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1971).
11. The savings per client per day as a result of group home placement as opposed to
placement in an institutional setting are set out in WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATIVE BUDGET
COMMITTEE, PHASE I REPORT #91-2, RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR CLIENTS WITH
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, A REPORT TO THE 1991 WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE
(1991).
12. See, e.g., Rhonda Hillbery, Group Home's Point of Peril: Is the Danger Inside or
Outside?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1992, at AS.
13. For an overview of the historical roots of societal fear of and discrimination against
individuals with disabilities see, Laura A. Lorenzo, Societal Prejudice Reflected In Our Courts:
The Unfavorable Treatment of the Mentally Retarded, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 771 (1989).
14. In DEAR, supra note 6, at 14, the author discusses and refutes these commonly voiced
NIMBY concerns regarding proposed human service facilities in residential neighborhoods. Dear
cites empirical studies refuting the claim that small to medium sized group homes have any
negative affect on property values. Ultimately, Dear concludes that the property value argument
"has been reduced to the status of myth." Id. See, e.g., MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT [since
renamed Judge Bazebon Center for Mental Health and the Law], THE EFFECT OF GROUP
HOMES ON NEIGHBORING PROPERTY (1988) (summarizing various studies conducted between
1973 and 1989 on group homes and their effect on surrounding property values). None of the
studies indicated a decline in property values as a result of group homes. Id.
For an argument refuting the claim that group homes negatively impact the character of the
neighborhood in which they are sited and a discussion of the positive affects a group home can
have in communities, see ROBERT PERSKE, NEW LIFE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD: HOW
PERSONS WITH RETARDATION AND OTHER DISABILITIES CAN HELP MAKE A GOOD
COMMUNITY BETTER (1980).
15. See Nora A. Uehlein, Annotation, Community Residence for Mentally Disabled PersonsAs
Violation of Restrictive Covenant, 41 A.L.R.4th 1216 (1985) (listing various state cases in which
neighbors have sought injunctions against group homes).
16. See, e.g., Hillbery, supra note 12, at AS.
17. Michael Winerip, Police Suspect Arson In Blaze At Site of a Proposed Group Home, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1989, at B2.
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both legislative and judicial methods in which neighbors and/or local
governments have resisted group homes for the disabled. 8 A quick
survey exposes three methods typically used.
First, certain municipalities have, in response to public pressure,
taken a "pro-active" approach by passing zoning ordinances specifically
aimed at limiting the number and location of group homes for the
disabled in their community. For example, Miami Beach banned
group homes for the disabled on certain commercial streets in response
to concerns that the presence of disabled residents in these areas would
"deter shopping and tourism."1 9 In Burstyn v. City of Miami
Beach,"0 a federal district court struck down the ordinance on equal
protection grounds. 2
Second, some cities have utilized pre-existing zoning ordinances
in attempts to exclude group homes. 2 Although there are some
variations," these cities typically justify excluding group homes by
claiming that group home residents are in fact boarders or tenants, and
as a result, the home violates "single-family use" zoning ordinances. 4
Finally, in the absence of either willing local officials or applicable
zoning ordinances, group home neighbors have petitioned the courts
to enforce private covenants restricting property to single-family
dwellings/residential use.25 For example, in Crane Neck Ass'n,
homeowners in an affluent subdivision contended that a group home
housing eight developmentally disabled adults violated a restrictive
covenant.2 6 The convenant stipulated that "there shall not be
constructed nor maintained on said premises other than single family
dwellings." 27 In an influential opinion, the Crane Neck court agreed
with the homeowner's association that the group home violated both
18. See, e.g., Uehlein, supra note 15; James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes
a "Family" Within Meaning of Zoning Regulation or Restrictive Covenant, 71 A.L.R.3d 693 (1976).
19. See Burstyn v. City of Miami Beach, 663 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
20. 663 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
21. Id. at 536.
22. E.g., City of Kenner v. Normal Life of Louisiana, Inc., 483 So. 2d 903, 906 (La. 1986)
(holding that a zoning ordinance that restricted property use to "single family dwellings"
prohibited a group home housing five unrelated disabled residents).
23. See City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435-37 (1985)
(discussing an antiquated city ordinance that required a special use permit for "hospitals for the
feeble minded," applied in an effort to exclude a group home for the disabled). The special use
permit requirement was struck down on equal protection grounds by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Id. at 439-42, 454.
24. E.g., Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (Ohio 1980).
25. See, e.g., Crane Neck Ass'n. v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 460
N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1984).
26. Id. at 1338.
27. Id.
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the letter and spirit of the restrictive covenant.28 It then held,
however, that the overriding public policy of the state of New York
prevented the court from enforcing the covenant against the group
home. 29
Other state and federal courts have not followed Crane Neck and
have adopted wildly diverse opinions as to whether group homes
violate "single-family dwelling/residential use" restrictive covenants.3 °
Factors that have contributed in varying degrees to the seemingly ad
hoc nature of judicial determinations that a group home is or is not a
"single-family dwelling" or a "residential use" within the meaning of
a restrictive covenant include: the wording of the covenant involved,3 the size and activities of the group home, 2 legislative
pronouncements, 33 as well as traditional notions of what constitutes
a family. 34 In Washington, in the aftermath of Mains Farm, judicial
precedent now seems firmly set: A small for-profit group home for the
disabled is not a "single-family dwelling/residential use" within the
meaning of a private restrictive covenant.35
A.

Particularly ProblematicSuits

Given (1) the empirically demonstrated benefits of community
based living for individuals with disabilities, 36 and (2) the lack of any
evidence supporting claims that group homes for the disabled

28. Id. at 1339.
29. Id. at 1343.
30. See, e.g., Adult Group Properties Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 467 (Ind.App. 1987)
(finding that "family" in subdivision covenant means only those related by blood or marriage).
But see Collins v. City of El Campo, 684 S.W.2d 756, 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that
"single family dwelling" restrictive covenant was merely an architectural designation).
31. In Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Okla. 1985), the court determined that
a group home did not violate a "single family" covenant because there was no explicit additional
requirement in the covenant that the family in question must consist of individuals related to one
another.
32. In Omega Corp. of Chesterfield v. Malloy, 319 S.E.2d 728, 732 (Va. 1984), the court
held that the presence of a rotating staff of counselors supervising the dient's daily activities
converted what might otherwise have been a single family use into a "facility" in violation of the
covenant.

33. In Crane Neck, the legislature's general statement of policy favoring the establishment
of community based group homes for the disabled was ultimately determinative in the court's
decision to refuse to enjoin the group home's operation. 460 N.E.2d at 1343.
34. E.g., Adult Group Properties, 505 N.E.2d at 467 (holding "family" in restrictive covenant
to mean only immediate blood relatives).
35. See Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d at 821, 854 P.2d at 1077 (concluding that an owneroperated group home housing four disabled individuals was a "commercial facility" and not a
"single family dwelling/residential use.").
36. See, e.g., GOLLAY, supra note 8.
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negatively impact the neighborhoods in which they are situated,3 7
NIMBY lawsuits to exclude group homes from particular communities
are extremely problematic. Suits like Crane Neck and Mains Farm, in
which neighbors attempt to enforce facially neutral restrictive covenants
against group homes, are particularly troubling for two reasons: (1)
The exclusion of group homes for the disabled from residential
subdivisions is potentially disruptive of the benefits of group home
living,3" and (2) suits to enforce restrictive covenants represent a
relatively easy method of banishing group homes from residential
neighborhoods.3 9
Single-family dwelling/residential use restrictive covenants are
commonly created and imposed by developers of residential subdivisions in an effort to create stable, predictable residential communities.4 ° Stable residential communities facilitate the opportunity for
both the "normalization" and community integration that is essential
to a therapeutic group home environment.41 The most obvious long
term danger posed by further Mains Farm-type law suits in Washington is that group homes could be effectively excluded from planned
residential subdivisions, arguably the most appropriate sites for group
homes, and relegated to less suitable and potentially more dangerous
surroundings.42
The second reason restrictive-covenant-based suits against group
homes are particularly problematic lies in the distinction between
zoning regulations and restrictive covenants. In contrast to zoning
decisions, restrictive covenants can be privately created and relatively
easily enforced.

37. DEAR, supra note 6, at 16.
38. In MARTIN JAFFEE & THOMAS P. SMITH, SITING GROUP HOMES FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 8 (1986), the authors raise the concern that concentration of group
homes in poorer, less stable, and less residential neighborhoods "has the potential for undercutting
normalization." The authors warn that two particular types of areas are especially inappropriate
for group homes because they present particular impediments to therapeutic residential living:
(1) quasi-commercial and/or semi-industrial areas, and (2) high crime areas. Id.
39. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM et al., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 471-75, 484 (2d ed. 1993).
40. Gerald Korngold, Single Family Use Covenants: For Achieving a Balance Between
Traditional Family Life and Individual Autonomy, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 951 (1989).
41. In a nationwide survey conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office, operators of
group homes for the disabled were asked to rate the various factors that contributed to their siting
decisions. The survey found that neighborhood safety, site privacy, well-maintained homes and
properties, adequate lot size, and access to public transportation and community resources were
considered "very important or essential" by most group home sponsors. UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF ZONING AND OTHER PROBLEMS
AFFECTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUP HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED 9
(1983).
42. See supra note 38.
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Zoning regulations are controlled by legislative processes. Thus,
NIMBY sentiment needs to be both particularly strong and particularly
wide spread to create a pro-active zoning ordinance that excludes group
homes. In addition, in all cases involving zoning legislation there is
state action. As a result, there is an added constitutional requirement
of judicial scrutiny into whether a rational relationship exists between
the zoning choice involved and a legitimate state objective.43
In contrast, an individual subdivision resident could bring suit to
enjoin the operation of a neighboring group home on the grounds that
it violates a single-family dwelling restrictive covenant. Neither
principles of constitutional law, nor the common law of covenants
obliges a court to require rationality or to initiate any inquiry into the
potentially discriminatory reasons behind the plaintiff s choice to bring
suit to enforce the covenant. 44 If a court finds, as happened in Mains
Farm, that an enforceable "single-family dwelling/residential use"
restrictive covenant has been violated, the judicial inquiry will often go
no further. 4' Absent an explicit overriding public policy,46 the
operation of the group home typically will be enjoined. The Mains
Farm case both exemplifies this problem and begins to hint at a
solution.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAINS FARM DECISION
In December 1987, Selma Worthington purchased a home in the
Mains Farm subdivision near Sequim, Washington.4 7 Ms. Worthington was licensed by the Washington State Department of Social and
Health Services as an operator of an "adult family home."4 Raymond Miller and three other disabled individuals, ranging in age from
75 to 98, lived in the home at Mains Farm with Ms. Worthington and

43. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974) (applying 14th
amendment equal protection analysis to a local zoning ordinance.)
44. See, e.g., Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 258-60 (1st Cir.
1993) (finding no state action when a court enforces a private, facially-neutral, restrictive
covenant, and determining that no constitutional or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 inquiry is possible);
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 39, at 471-75, 484 (discussing that as long as a real covenant is: (1)
found to "touch and concern" the land, and (2) there is intent to bind successors, an injunction
to enforce the covenant will be "routinely granted.").
45. See, e.g., Uehlein supra note 15.
46. See, e.g., Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 460
N.E.2d 1336, 1343 (N.Y. 1984).
47. Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington, 64 Wash. App. 171, 173, 824 P.2d
495, 496 (1992), affd, 121 Wash. 2d 810, 854 P.2d 1072 (1993).
48. Id.
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her two children.49 Ms. Worthington purchased the property subject
to a restrictive covenant stipulating that "all lots or tracts permitted in
Mains Farm shall be designated as 'residence lots' and shall be used
for single family residential purposes only."' 0 Ms. Worthington did
not believe that her household violated the covenant.5"
In January 1988, the Mains Farm Homeowners Association filed
suit against Ms. Worthington alleging that her "adult foster care
commercial enterprise" violated the covenant.5 2 The Homeowner's
association sought only an injunction, alleged no damages, and offered
no evidence that Ms. Worthington's group home adversely affected
their community.5 3
On cross motions for summary judgment, the Clallum County
Superior Court determined that, although the group home created "no
extraordinary impact on the neighborhood, 5 4 the "overriding
commercial elements" inherent in the group home's operation violated
the covenant.55 In both the Court of Appeals and the Washington
State Supreme Court, Worthington consistently argued (1) that her
group home was a single-family residence within the meaning of the
covenant, and (2) that the covenant, as enforced against her group
home, was contrary to public policy and thus void.56 She lost both
appeals.57
The Washington State Supreme court rejected Ms. Worthington's
arguments in a seven to two decision.5" Justice Brachtenbach's
majority opinion begins with a discussion of various often quoted, and
often contradictory, judicial axioms applied in construing restrictive

49. Brief for Appellants at 2, Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington, 64 Wash.
App. 171, 824 P.2d 495 (1992) (No. 13085-8-11), affd, 121 Wash. 2d 810, 854 P.2d 1072 (1993).
50. Mains Farm, 64 Wash. App. at 173, 824 P.2d at 496.
51. Deposition on Oral Pre-Trial Examination of Selma Worthington at 4-5, Mains Farm
(Clallarn County Super. Ct. No. 88-2-00339-7) (1989).
52. Mains Farm, 64 Wash. App. at 174, 824 P.2d at 497.
53. On the contrary, the only evidence on record indicated that the four elderly residents of
Worthington's household were quiet, generally stayed indoors, and received visitors only once or
twice per month. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 2, Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d 810, 854 P.2d 1072
(No. 59058-3) (1993). On the whole, there was no greater coming and going at Worthington's
Adult Family Home than at other homes in the neighborhood. Id.
54. Memorandum Opinion at 2, Mains Farm (Clallam County Super. Ct. No. 88-2-00339-7)
(1989).
55. Id. at 5.
56. See Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d at 810, 854 P.2d at 1072; Mains Farm, 64 Wash. App.
at 179, 824 P.2d at 499.
57. Id.
58. Mains Farm, 121 Wash 2d. at 827, 833, 854 P2d at 1080, 1083.
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covenants." 9 The court then turned to the initial question of whether
Ms. Worthington's group home violated the "single-family" aspect of
the Mains Farm covenant.
The court first observed that, although there is an extensive array
of cases in which various courts have struggled with the concept of
what constitutes a family, "[n]o purpose would be served by examining
or comparing them."6 The court then concluded that the various
dictionary definitions of the word "family" were similarly unhelpful,
in part because "the fact that a group home is set up to emulate family
behavior should not be regarded as a sufficient condition for family
status.

61

Ultimately, in an apparent attempt to set out a coherent test for
future cases in this state in which the meaning and extent of a "singlefamily use" restrictive covenant will surely be tested, the court set out
four characteristics which it attributes to "the concept of family":
(1) a sharing of responsibilities among members, a mutual caring
whether physical or emotional,
(2) some commonality whether it be friendship, shared employment, mutual social or political interest,
(3) some degree of existing or contemplated permanency to the
relationship, and
(4) a recognition of some common purpose, persons6 brought
together by reasons other than referral by a state agency.
The court did not explicitly apply its four-part test to the
Worthington household, but instead concluded that, in the case of a
state licensed for-profit group home for the dependent elderly, "a well
socialized speaker of English almost certainly would deny the
application of 'family' in favor of 'nursing home'. "63
The majority opinion next addressed a second, related restriction
in the covenant: that the property be used for "residential purposes
only." The court took pains to distinguish Hunter's Tract Improvement

59. The majority in Mains Farm had difficulty reconciling the axiom that restrictive
covenants are to be strictly construed, e.g., Hunters Tract Improvement Co. v. Corporation of
Catholic Bishops, 95 Wash. 112, 114, 167 P.100, 101 (1917), with (1) the axiom that the court's
primary objective in construing restrictive covenants is to determine the intent of the parties, e.g.,
Lakes at Mercer Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Witrak, 61 Wash. App. 177, 179, 810 P.2d 27, 2829 (1991), and (2) the rule that language in a restrictive covenant is to be given its ordinary and
common meaning. E.g., Krein v. Smith, 60 Wash. App. 809, 811, 807 P.2d 906, 907 (1991).
See Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d at 815-16, 845 P.2d at 1074.
60. Id.at 817, 854 P.2d at 1074.
61. Id.
62. Id.at 817-18, 854 P.2d at 1075.
63. Id.at 818, 854 P.2d at 1075.
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Co. v. Corporationof Catholic Bishops,64 a 1917 Washington case that
the defenders of the group home had argued was controlling.6"
Hunter's Tract involved a similar "residential purposes only" restriction
that neighbors attempted to apply against a nunnery that was both a
residence for approximately fifteen Catholic nuns and a site for
occasional religious ceremonies.6 6 In Hunter's Tract, the court held
that, because the "main use and purpose" of the nunnery was as a
residence, occasional and incidental non-residential use did not violate
a "residential use only" restrictive covenant.67
Although the Mains Farm majority distinguished the Hunter's
Tract case as "markedly different,"68 it applied Hunter's Tract's
terminology against Ms. Worthington's operation of a group home in
her residence: "In this case, the 'main use and purpose' is not to
provide a single-family residence, but to provide 24-hour protective
care in exchange for money.''69
The court determined that a more recent Washington Court of
Appeals decision, Hagemann v. Worth,70 was more on point.7
Hagemann also involved a group home for elderly, disabled individuals
that had been licensed by the state as an adult family home.72
Although the court's decision in Hagemann to enjoin the operation of
the group home was based primarily on a covenant explicitly prohibiting "business, industry, or commercial industry of any kind or
nature,"73 the state supreme court found that Hagemann was "remarkably similar" to Mains Farm.74 In a decision that does not bode well
for group home operators, home sharing programs, or anyone who
operates any type of small business out of his or her home, the
Washington State Supreme Court in Mains Farm adopted the
reasoning of the Hagemann Court: A group home for the disabled
violates a residential use only restrictive covenant because "business is
an antonym of residential.... [T]o provide a residence to paying
customers is not synonymous with a residential purpose."7 5

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

98 Wash. 112, 167 P. 100 (1917).
Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d at 819, 854 P.2d at 1076.
Hunter's Tract, 98 Wash. at 113, 167 P. at 101.
Id. at 115, 167 P. at 101.
Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d at 819, 854 P.2d at 1075.
Id. at 820, 854 P.2d at 1076.
56 Wash. App. 85, 782 P.2d 1072 (1989).
Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d at 820, 854 P.2d at 1076.
Hagemann, 56 Wash. App. at 87, 782 P.2d at 1073.
Id.
Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d. at 820, 854 P.2d at 1077.
Id. at 820, 854 P.2d at 1077.
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The Mains Farm majority determined that Hagemann's "analysis
is sound and its reasoning persuasive."76 It ultimately went on to
conclude that, because Ms. Worthington was paid for the twenty-fourhour-a-day care she provided to Raymond Miller and the three other
disabled residents of Worthington's group home, (1) "her house is
more institutional in nature than familial,"" and (2) "the residential
nature of defendant's use of her home is destroyed by the elements of
commercialism.""8
After deciding against the defendant on the initial issue of whether
the covenant had been violated, the majority opinion in Mains Farm
addressed the defendant's second argument: Even if her group home
is found to violate the "single-family dwelling/residential use"
restrictive covenant, public policy dictates that the covenant is void as
enforced against an adult family home.79 The Mains Farm court
found that "[t]he record is not adequate to identify the facts and
policies upon which such a significant public policy should be
considered.""0 Thus, the court "expressed no opinion" on the public
policy question in this case."'
In rejecting the defendants' public policy arguments, the court
seemed to lament that Worthington did not produce a more comprehensive study of governmental goals, efforts, needs, and successes in
establishing adult family homes to serve the residential needs of the
disabled in Washington State. 2 The court accepted as relevant the
Washington State Legislature finding "that adult family homes are an
important part of the state's long-term care system. '"R3 However, the
court also seemed swayed by the lack of any explicit legislative
declaration in Washington State that group homes shall be considered
single-family residences for the purposes of private restrictive
covenants.8 4 As a substitute for an explicit legislative pronouncement,
the court provided a laundry list of evidentiary factors future litigants
must establish as a prerequisite to any judicial pronouncement that

76. Id. at 820, 854 P.2d at 1076.
77. Id. at 821, 854 P.2d at 1077.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court distinguished and rejected various cases presented by the defense,
including Crane Neck, in which courts in other states have found an overriding public policy
favoring the establishment of group homes for the disabled, and thus refused to enforce a private

restrictive covenant against similarly situated group homes. Id. at 824-25, 854 P.2d at 1079-80.
82. Id. at 822, 854 P.2d at 1077-78.
83. Id. at 821-22, 854 P.2d at 1077 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 70.128.005 (1992)).
84. See id. at 822, 854 P.2d at 1077.
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there is an overriding public policy in Washington State favoring the
establishment of group homes for the disabled."5
In essence, the court concluded that future defenders of group
homes will need to present it with considerably more facts about (1)
the Washington State Legislature's policy regarding adult family
homes, and (2) impediments to efforts to establish an adequate number
of adult family homes. Specifically, the court dictated that, in future
cases involving the same public policy argument, it would consider all
evidence tending to show:
(1) that such a statewide policy exists;
(2) that there is a need which is not being met;
(3) that other efforts are or are not being taken to meet the need
(4) [that] there is a public policy intended to override existing
protective covenants;
(5) [that] the restriction of RCW 70.128.175 to zoning was a
deliberate legislative effort to avoid conflict with existing protective
covenants, and
(6) ... [that] the effect of such asserted policy on existing contractual rights and the concomitant question of governmental taking. 6
Part III of this Note will address the significant burden of
showing this overriding public policy under the six factor test set out
in Mains Farm.
At the end of its opinion, the Mains Farm majority declined, on
procedural grounds, 7 to consider two issues: (1) whether the actions
of the Mains Farm Homeowner's Association in this case violated the
federal Fair Housing Act, 8 and (2) whether the homeowner's attempt
to enforce the covenant against the Worthington group home violated
Washington's Law Against Discrimination. 9 An analysis of these
statues, and their applicability in future cases will be discussed in Part
IV of this Note.

85. Id. at 822, 854 P.2d at 1078.
86. Id.
87. The court declined to consider the claim under the federal Fair Housing Act on the
grounds that the issue was "raised first and only by amicus." Id. at 826, 854 P.2d at 1080.

Similarly, the court refused to address the argument that the Mains Farm neighbors' conduct
violated Washington's Law Against Discrimination on the grounds that it "need not consider
arguments raised in a supplemental brief." Id. at 826-27, 854 P.2d at 1080.
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60 (1994).
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SEARCHING FOR AN OVERRIDING PUBLIC POLICY

The most immediate and ominous repercussion of the Mains Farm
decision is that group homes for the disabled in Washington State that
are proposed or currently situated on property subject to single-family
dwelling/residential use restrictive covenants are vulnerable to judicial
attack as covenants violating commercial enterprises. In responding to
this threat, advocates for the disabled must begin to compile the factual
material delineated by the court as a necessary prerequisite to any
future attempt to re-litigate the first issue left undecided in Mains
Farm: Whether the public policy in Washington State to facilitate the
establishment of adult family homes is sufficient to override a private
restrictive covenant.
Initially, it is clear from both the tone and complexity of the
public policy test set out in Mains Farm that the court would have
preferred an explicit declaration by the Washington State Legislature
that "single-family dwelling/residential use" restrictive covenants are
Although there is no such
void if used against a group home.
explicit pronouncement in Washington State law,9 various other state
legislatures have, to a varying degree, limited the applicability of
private restrictive covenants to group homes for the disabled. 2

90. The Mains Farm majority's six factor public policy test creates an alternative method of
finding an overriding public policy in which future group home defenders must initially show (1)
explicit evidence of a public policy favoring the establishment of community based group homes,
and (2) evidence that the need for group homes is not being met despite government efforts to
encourage their establishment. The court strongly hints that it would balance evidence of
legislative intent and demonstrated need against arguments that the legislature implicitly approves
of the use of restrictive covenants against group homes by not explicitly disallowing it, and
neighbor's claims that refusals to enforce covenants against group homes constitutes a
governmental taking. See Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d at 822, 854 P.2d at 1078.
The need for this relatively convoluted analysis would be extinguished by a simple legislative
pronouncement that group homes are single family residences for purposes of private restrictive
covenants.
91. The Washington State Legislature has, in contrast, explicitly dictated that "[aldult family
home[s] shall be considered a residential use of property for zoning purposes. Adult family homes
shall be a permitted use in all areas zoned for residential or commercial purposes, including areas
zoned for single family dwellings." WASH. REV. CODE § 70.128.175(2) (1994).
It should be noted that at least two courts in other states have cited to similar statutory
language, classifying group homes as "single family dwellings" for zoning purposes, and have
found a more general public policy overriding a private covenant as applied against a group home
for the disabled. See Westood Homeowners Ass'n v. Tenhoff, 745 P. 2d 976, 982-84 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987); McMillan v. Iserman, 327 N.W.2d 559, 563 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
92. See JAFFEE & SMITH, supra note 38, at 8. This report lists Indiana, Iowa, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin as states that, as of 1985, had enacted statutory
pronouncements voiding all private restrictive covenants expressly or implicitly prohibiting group
homes for the disabled. In addition, the Arizona, California, and Missouri legislatures had
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Washington's state legislature has not yet made a similar explicit
public policy pronouncement. However, it has stated that "adult
family homes are an important part of the state's long-term care
system. Adult family homes provide an alternative to institutional care
93
and promote a high degree of independent living for residents."
Given this existing evidence that the legislature favors the establishment of adult family homes, and the road map set out by the majority
in Mains Farm, it is possible that a court would rule favorably on the
public policy issue. Group home defenders would need to present
evidence sufficient to show the court (1) that there is an ongoing unmet
need for more adult family homes in Washington state, and (2) that
the use and abuse of private restrictive "single family dwelling/residential purpose only" covenants significantly impedes state
efforts to site group homes for the disabled in appropriate residential
communities.
A.

Unmet Need and the Impact of Restrictive Covenants

A 1990 study estimated that there are approximately 70,000
severely disabled individuals and 73,500 frail elderly persons with
unmet housing needs in Washington State.94 The study specifically
addressed the continuing need to complete the transfer of developmentally disabled individuals out of inappropriate nursing home environments and into less restrictive, community-based group homes. 95 In
addition, the study indicated that roughly 15,800 low income elderly
individuals currently living either independently or in retirement
communities would benefit from community based small scale
residential care.96
A report compiled by the Washington State Department of Social
and Health Services in January of 1992 initially identifies 46 cities and
19 counties in Washington State in need of adult family homes.97 In

enacted similar statutes but excluded existing covenants from their reach. Id. at 16-20.
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 70-128.005 (1994).
94. JAMES L. MCINTRIE & STANISLAV FRITZ, INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND
MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, CLOSING THE GAP: HOUSING NEEDS IN
WASHINGTON STATE 17-18 (1990).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 18-19.
97. WASHINGTON STATE AGING AND ADULT SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, AREAS WITH UNMET ADULT

FAMILY HOME NEEDS 1-2 (1992). The cities designated as in need of adult family homes
include: Anacortes, Arlington, Buckley, Burlington, Carnation, Centralia/Chehais, Chelan, Cle
Elum, Colville, Connell, Dayton, Edwall, Ellensburg, (East and North) Everett, Forks, Granite
Falls, Kelso, La Cross, Little Rock, Longview, Monroe, Mt. Vernon, Naches, North Bend, Oak
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addition, the report specifically states that "[a]l regions need homes
that will accept publicly paid residents.""8 Other reports prepared by
the Aging and Adult Services Administration, the licensing agency for
group homes for the disabled elderly in this state, similarly document
both state efforts to facilitate the establishment of licensed adult family
homes and the continuing unmet need for group homes in Washington
State. 99
Ultimately, both state efforts to encourage the establishment of
group homes for the disabled and the continuing unmet need for this
type of residence can be convincingly established. However, the exact
impact that "single family dwelling/residential use" restrictive
covenants will have on the number and locations of group homes in
this state in the post Mains Farm era is less demonstrable.
A number of studies in other states have addressed the problems
associated with clustering of group homes in urban areas and poorer
What is needed, however, is an empirical study
neighborhoods.'
demonstrating a nexus in Washington State between single-family
residential-use restrictive covenants prevalent in more affluent
neighborhoods and residential subdivisions, and the unmet need for
appropriate community-based housing for the disabled in Washington
State. In the absence of such a study, it will be difficult for group
home defenders to quantify the extent to which the threat of Mains
Farm type law suits impedes the establishment of group homes for the
disabled in this state.
Ultimately, given (1) the relatively complicated public policy road
map in Mains Farm, (2) the lack of an explicit overriding legislative
pronouncement, and (3) the lack of a comprehensive empirical study
linking the phenomenon of private restrictive covenants to the
demonstrated unmet need for group homes in Washington State,
disabled individuals and group home operators should not rely
exclusively on public policy arguments to defend themselves against
the charge that, under the Mains Farm analysis, their living arrange-

Harbor, Oaksdale, Orting, Pomeroy, Port Angeles, Port Townsend, Prosser, Quilcene, Rainier,
Raymond, Rochester, Rosyln, Roy, Sedro Wooley, Stanwood, Sultan, Tenino, Tumwater,
Waitsburg, Waterville, West Olympia, and Yelm. The counties include: Columbia, Cowlitz,
Ferry, Garfield, Island, Kittitas, Klickitat, Lewis, Lincoln, Mason, Pacific, Pend Oreille, (East)
Pierce, San Juan, Skagit, Skamania, (Northern) Stevens, Wahkiakurn, and Whitman.
98. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The report additionally states that "[h]omes are also needed
for persons with special care needs, i.e., advanced dementias; traumatic brain injury; multiple
sclerosis; mental illness, etc." Id.
99. See, e.g., AGING AND ADULT SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, ADULT FAMILY HOME
CARE MULTIPLE FACILITY OWNERSHIP: A REPORT TO THE 1992 LEGISLATURE (1991).
100. See SMITH & JAFFE, supra note 38, at 9.
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ments violate "single family dwelling/residential use" restrictive
covenants. Instead, defenders of group homes should emphasize that
suits like Mains Farm violate existing federal and state fair housing
laws.
IV.

FEDERAL AND STATE FAIR HOUSING LAWS

The Mains Farm majority swiftly disposed of a claim raised in
amicus briefs that the neighbors' conduct in Mains Farm violated the
federal Fair Housing Act. 101 The court simply pronounced, "[w]e do
not consider issues raised first and only by amicus."' 2 Regardless
of either the jurisprudential inaccuracy of this unequivocal pronouncement, 10 3 or its unfortunate result of allowing the Mains Farm homeowners to violate state and federal law with impunity, the Washington
State Supreme Court has sent a clear message to litigators and
advocates for the disabled in Washington State: Be cognizant of both
federal and state statutes protecting the disabled from discrimination
inhousing, and use these anti-discrimination statutes at the trial court
level.
A.

The Federal Fair Housing Act

The 1988 amendments to the federal Fair Housing Act extended
the original 1968 Fair Housing Act's prohibitions against discrimination in housing based on race, religion, or national origin, to (1)
discrimination against families, and (2) discrimination against the
disabled.) 4
101. See Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d at 827, 854 P.2d at 1080.
102. Id.
103. Justice Brachtenbach is correct in asserting that the Washington State Supreme Court
need not necessarily address an issue raised only in an amicus brief. See, e.g., Coburn v. Seda,
101 Wash. 2d 270, 279, 677 P.2d 173, 178 (1984). However, this is not a hard and fast
prohibition. "An appellate court has the inherent authority to consider issues which the parties
have not raised if doing so is necessary to a proper decision." Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wash.
2d 645, 659, 782 P.2d 974, 982 (1989). Whether there is a broad public interest in the issue is
a factor the court should consider in determining whether or not to consider an issue not raised
by the parties. See Port of Edmonds v. Northwest Fur Breeders Coop., Inc., 63 Wash. App. 159,
164, 816 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991).
104. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(b), 102 Stat. 1619,
1622 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988)). The 1988 amendments also
significantly increased the government's authority to enforce the federal Fair Housing Act by (1)
creating a federal administrative structure to process housing discrimination claims, see id. § 8, 102
Stat. 1619, 1625-33 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1988)), and (2)
allowing the U.S. Justice Department to seek monetary damages on behalf of victims of
discrimination proscribed by the act. See id., 102 Stat. 1619, 1634-35 (1988) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d) (1988)). It is worth noting that despite numerous U.S. Supreme Court
decisions recognizing extremely broad congressional power to regulate private behavior under the
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Under the 1988 Amendments, it is unlawful "[t]o discriminate in
the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling
to any buyer or renter because of handicap." '
It is also unlawful
to "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of the sale or rental of a dwelling . . . because of a handicap.' 0 6 Additionally, the Act provides that it is unlawful discrimination to refuse "to make reasonable accommodations in the rules,
policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
person equal opportunity to use
necessary to afford [a handicapped]
07
and enjoy a dwelling.'
In clarifying the intent behind the plain language of the statute,
the drafters of the 1988 amendments specified that one of their
purposes was "to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with
The House Report
handicaps from the American mainstream."' 0'
that accompanied the 1988 amendments explicitly dictates that "[t]he
Act is intended to prohibit the application of ... restrictive covenants
S.. that have the effect of limiting the ability of [handicapped]
individuals to live in the residence of their choice."'
In ruling on suits alleging discriminatory application of faciallyneutral restrictive covenants, courts have heeded this explicit expression
of congressional intent and found that the use of private restrictive
covenants to exclude group homes for the disabled from particular
residential communities violates the federal Fair Housing Act."' In
Commerce Clause, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), one federal district court judge has analyzed the federal
Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988 and concluded that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional powers in proscribing private acts of discrimination against disabled individuals.
Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 695, 727-34 (1992), affd
on other grounds, 18 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1994).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(1) (1988). "Handicap" with respect to a person under the federal
Fair Housing Act is defined very broadly as "(1) a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (2) a record of having such
impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1988).

106. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) (1988).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1988).
108. H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.

2173, 2179.
109. Id. at 24, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185 (emphasis added). The House Report explicitly
dictates that subsection 3604(f)(2), which bars discrimination against disabled individuals in the
terms and conditions of the sale or rental of a dwelling, "is intended to prohibit special restrictive
covenants... which have the effect of excluding, for example, congregate living arrangements for
persons with handicaps." Id. at 23, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2184 (emphasis added).
110. United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555, 1561-62 (D. Kan. 1992) (finding a neighbor's
threat to bring suit to enforce a "single family dwelling" restrictive covenant against a group home
violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(IXB) because the threat to sue made the dwelling "unavailable...
because of handicap."); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of P.R., 752 F. Supp. 1152 (D.P.R.
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various other instances, courts have found that the Act reaches not
only practices that are discriminatory on their face, but also facially
neutral terms or conditions of sale or rental of property that have the
effect of discriminating against individuals with disabilities, or
members of other classes protected under the act.'
If no intent to discriminate is evident, courts have developed a
disparate impact analysis for discrimination claims brought under the
Fair Housing Act.112 Under this four-pronged test, a court will
examine whether the effect of defendant's facially neutral action is
impermissibly discriminatory. The relevant factors are:
(1) the strength of the showing of discriminatory effect;
(2) whether there is some evidence of discriminatory intent;

(3) the alleged discriminator's professed interest in taking the action
complained of, and
(4) whether the complaining party seeks to affirmatively compel

others to provide housing for members of a protected class, or
merely seeks to restrain others from interfering with individual
property owners wishing to provide such housing." 3

This four-part disparate impact test has been applied, and
unlawful discrimination prohibited under the Fair Housing Act has
been found under conditions remarkably similar to Mains Farm.114
In Casa Marie v. Superior Court, neighbors in a residential neighborhood in San Juan, Puerto Rico successfully petitioned the local
court to enjoin the operation of a medium size "elder-care facility" that
allegedly violated a "single family residential use" restrictive covenant.'
Eventually, nine disabled elderly residents of the home filed

1990), vacated on other grounds, 988 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding neighbors' suit to enforce
a restrictive covenant and enjoin the operation of an "elder care facility" violated the federal Fair
Housing Act). See also Cypress Bend Homeowners Ass'n of Countryside, Inc., H.U.D.A.L.J.
No. 04-92-0883-1, 1993 WL 668031 (May 5, 1993) (HUD Determination of Reasonable Cause
and Charge of Discrimination against Homeowners Association that had threatened suit to enforce
a restrictive covenant to stop the establishment of a group home for disabled adults in their
neighborhood).
111. See, e.g., Lindmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977);
Carson v. Rochester Housing Auth., 748 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that housing
authority's regulation requiring proof of ability to "live independently" discriminated against
disabled applicants).
112. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977).
113. Association of Relatives and Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations & Permits
Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 106 (D.P.R. 1990).
114. See Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of P.R., 752 F. Supp. 1152 (D.P.R. 1990),
vacated on other grounds 988 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993).
115. Id. at 1154-55.
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a claim in federal district court alleging that the local court's action
discriminated against them in violation of both the federal Fair
Housing Act and the Equal Protection Clause." 6
The Federal District Court applied the four-part disparate impact
analysis to the claim brought under the Fair Housing Act." 7
Initially, the court found that since the result of the neighbors' action
to enforce the covenant "would be a broad scale exclusion of the
elderly handicapped as opposed to any other group of potential
Next, the
residents," "discriminatory effect was clearly present.""' '
of the
other
statements
and
various
testimony
the
that
court found
complaining neighbors demonstrated the minimal level of discriminatory intent to pass the second prong of the test." 9 Third, the court
found that the neighbor's professed reasons for excluding the group
home and its residents were pretextual. 20 Finally, the court noted
that the relief requested by the disabled elderly residents of Casa Marie
was merely "to be free of neighborhood interference."' 2 1 They did
not seek to affirmatively burden the complaining neighbors. 122
Both Mains Farm and Casa Marie involved neighbors' suits to
enforce a facially neutral "single family residential use" restrictive
covenant and enjoin a home for the disabled elderly from existing in
their neighborhood. Under a Casa Marie type four-part disparate
impact analysis, the conduct of the Mains Farm neighbors could
similarly have been found to violate the federal Fair Housing Act.
First, although the restrictive covenant in question was facially neutral,
its use to enjoin the operation of the group home effectively excluded
the disabled residents of the Worthington household from the Mains
Farm subdivision.
Additionally, the Mains Farm homeowners were unable to
demonstrate any adverse impact or undue burden on the neighborhood
due to the group home's operation. 3 As a result, it is extremely
unlikely that the neighbors could have presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for their suit to enjoin the operation of

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
59058-3)

Id.at 1152.
Id. at 1168-69.
Id. at 1169.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Brief of Amicus Curiae at 2, Mains Farm, 121 Wash. 2d 810, 854 P.2d 1072 (No.
(1993).
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Worthington's group home. Thus, the minimal requisite level of
discriminatory intent could have been inferred.
Finally, the homeowners in Mains Farm actively sought to
interfere with another property owner's attempt to provide needed
housing to a protected class of individuals. In contrast, the Worthington residents did not seek to affirmatively burden their neighbors.
Like the group home in Casa Marie, the Worthington household
merely sought to be free from the neighbors' interference.
The federal Fair Housing Act, as intended by Congress and as
enforced by the courts, protects disabled individuals' right to "live in
the residence of their choice," free from the discriminatory application
of facially neutral restrictive covenants. This federal statute is clearly
the most direct and potentially effective means of defending group
homes for the disabled against conduct like that in Mains Farm,
conduct that is discriminatory to the extent that it makes any residence
in a particular neighborhood unavailable to any individual simply
because of his or her disability.
B.

Washington State's Law Against Discrimination

In addition to refusing on procedural grounds to apply the federal
Fair Housing Act to the neighbors' conduct in Mains Farm,124 the
Washington State Supreme Court similarly determined that it "need
not consider" whether the neighbors' conduct violated Washington
because the defense did not raise
State's Law Against Discrimination
125
the issue at the trial court level.
The court's choice not to consider this claim is unfortunate. Like
the federal Fair Housing Act, Washington State's Law Against
Discrimination could have and should have protected the group home
residents' right to be free from the discriminatory application of a
facially neutral restrictive covenant.
RCW 49.60.224 provides that, "[e]very provision in a written
instrument relating to real property ...which directly or indirectly limits
the use or occupancy of real property on the basis of . . the presence
of any sensory, mental, or physical disability ... is void.' 26 In
clarifying its reach, RCW 49.60 states that Washington's Law Against

124. 121 Wash. 2d at 827, 854 P.2d at 1080.
125. Id. at 826, 854 P.2d at 1080.
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.224(1) (1994) (emphasis added). This statute also prohibits
similar discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or against families with
children. Id.

446

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 18:425

Discrimination "shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of
the purposes" of the act.127
The only published Washington appellate court decision involving
RCW 49.60.224 is Riste v. Eastern Washington Bible Camp, Inc. 2 '
Riste involved a deed provision that purported to require all occupants
of a certain premises to "conduct themselves" in a manner compatible
with the "Assembly of God Church. ' 129 The Court of Appeals
found that RCW 49.60.224 clearly applied to the deed provision. The
court then held that, because the provision directly limited the use of
the property based on creed, the restriction was void under RCW
49.60.224.130

Various state court cases have liberally construed and applied
131
other sections of Washington's Law Against Discrimination.
Washington courts have held that, because RCW 49.60 substantially
parallels various federal civil rights statutes, including the federal Fair
Housing Act, courts may look to judicial interpretation of federal antidiscrimination laws for guidance in interpreting Washington's Law
Against Discrimination.' 3 2 In addition, in 1993, the Washington
State Legislature expanded and strengthened RCW 49.60's provisions
prohibiting discrimination in housing and
created a state fair housing
133
act substantially replicating federal law.
Thus, despite the lack of specific judicial precedent with respect
to the application of RCW 49.60.224, it is extremely likely that a
Washington court applying this statute in a Mains Farm type situation
would follow existing federal precedent and utilize a disparate
impact/discriminatory impact test. Under the four-part federal
analysis discussed above, the disabled residents in the Mains Farm
group home could have shown that the neighbors' use of the otherwise
neutral restrictive covenant against the Worthington household directly
limited their ability to live in the Mains Farm subdivision based on
their disability and their concurrent need for twenty-four hour care.
Thus, the neighbors' suit to enjoin the operation of the group home
unlawfully discriminated against them in violation of RCW 49.60.224.

127. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.020 (1994).
128. 25 Wash. App. 299, 605 P.2d 1294 (1980).
129. Id. at 300, 605 P.2d at 1295.
130. Id. at 302, 605 P.2d at 1295.
131. See, e.g., Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash. 2d 368, 610 P.2d 857 (1980).
132. E.g., Holingsworth v. Washington Mut. Say. Bank, 37 Wash. App. 386, 390, 681 P.2d
845, 848 (1984), abrogatedon other grounds, Allison v. Housing Auth. of Seattle, 59 Wash. App.
624, 799 P.2d 1195 (1990).
133. See H.R. 1476, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 69, § 1-14, 1993 Wash. Laws 190-202.
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CONCLUSION

The Washington State Supreme Court's Mains Farm decision is
unfortunate and unsound for several reasons. First, it is unfortunate
that many of the actors involved in the Mains Farm case neglected to
address the needs and wants of the individuals whom the decision
affected most directly and destructively: the four elderly, disabled
residents of Worthington's household. Had the supreme court
considered the issues raised in the case from the perspective of those
individuals, it might possibly have understood and accepted that, for
at least six of the seven members of Worthington household, the "main
use and purpose" of the house was clearly as a residence, as their
home. Instead, the court seemed entirely fixated on the "commercial
elements" of Selma Worthington's role in the household, and ruled
accordingly.
Second, the supreme court majority opinion in Mains Farm is
unfortunate in that it opens up an especially slippery slope by which
all group homes for the disabled, as well as various other "nontraditional households" in this state, could easily be found to violate
typical "single family dwelling/residential use" restrictive covenants.
Third, despite available evidence of both governmental efforts to
establish an adequate number of adult family homes, and the continuing pressing need for group homes for the disabled in Washington
State, the Mains Farm court's reluctance to declare the covenant void
on public policy grounds creates a huge evidentiary hurdle for the next
group home defender who raises the public policy argument.
Ultimately, the decision is, at the very least, useful because it
further delineates the lines upon which future group home battles will
be fought. Future defenders of group homes for the disabled must
learn the lessons of Mains Farm. If these defenders are to adequately
serve their clients, and the more general class of disabled individuals
potentially denied housing under Mains Farm, the case must focus on
the plight of the disabled residents of the threatened group home.
Future group home defenders must: (1) initially and continuously
frame the issues in the case in terms of disabled group home residents'
state and federal statutory right to live in the home of their choice, and
(2) initially and continuously stress the aggregate insidious discriminatory effect of law suits like Mains Farm-the exclusion of small scale
group homes for the disabled from appropriate residential communities
throughout the state.
By framing future similar cases in terms of the statutory rights of
disabled group home residents, group home defenders will expose
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plaintiffs' underlying unfounded NIMBY sentiment, and successfully
defend against the discriminatory application of facially neutral
restrictive covenants.

